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The Gender Pay Gap in Top Corporate Jobs in Denmark: 
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This paper analyses the gender gap in compensation for CEOs, Vice-Directors, and potential 
top executives in the 2000 largest Danish private companies based on a panel data set of 
employer-employees data covering the period 1996-2005. During the period, the overall 
gender gap in compensation for top executives and potential top executives decreased from 
35 percent to 31 percent. However, contrary to many other studies, we do not find that the 
gender gap for Danish top executives disappears when controlling for observed individual 
and firm characteristics and unobserved individual heterogeneity. For CEOs, the raw 
compensation gap is 28 percent during the period while the estimated compensation gap 
after controlling for observed and unobserved characteristics increases to 30 percent. For 
executives below the CEO level, the estimated compensation gap is lower, ranging from 15 
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1.  Introduction. 
The proportion of women who reach top positions in Danish private firms is low compared to other 
EU countries. In 1996, only 3 percent of the CEOs in the largest Danish private firms were women. 
Ten years later, in 2005, this figure had increased to 5 percent. This may come as a surprise since 
Denmark was one of the first countries in OECD where women entered the labour market and 
became full time members of the workforce. Denmark was also one of the first Western countries 
which introduced extensive high quality public childcare as part of a political strategy of equal 
opportunities for men and women in the labour market in the 1960s and early 1970s, see OECD 
(2002). In 2006, Denmark was in a clear lead with respect to the coverage of publicly provided 
formal care for children aged 0-3 years, see EU Commission (2009). Hence it seems a paradox that 
Denmark is not doing very well in international comparisons of overall gender compensation gaps, 
the proportion of women on private boards or the number of women in top executive positions, see 
EU Commission (2009) and Terjesen and Singh (2008). Denmark is ranked as number 7 (of 134 
countries) on the overall ―Gender Gap Index‖ (see World Economic Forum (2009)), but when it 
comes to the gender gap for representation among ―legislators, senior officials and managers‖, 
Denmark is ranked low as no. 68. 
 
In a recent study, Gupta, Smith and Oaxaca (2006) have found that Danish women in the top of the 
wage distribution, incl. top executives, have been sliding down in the wage distribution during the 
latest decades, when controlling for observed qualifications. Exactly the opposite is found for a 
comparable group of US women. One of the hypotheses presented in the study by Gupta et al. is 
that the extended use in Denmark of family friendly policies which imply absence from work for 
shorter or longer periods (maternity leave, care days for sick children etc) is much more harmful for 
top managers and other high skilled women compared to women at the bottom of the labour market. 
If there exist severe potential boomerang effects of family friendly policies, we expect that these 
effects  should  be  more  widespread  in  the  top  of  hierarchy  of  private  firms,  i.e.  among  top 
executives such as CEOs and Vice-Directors.    
 
This paper analyses the gender pay gap in top corporate jobs in the 2000 largest Danish private 
companies  based  on  a  panel  of  employer-employees  data  covering  the  period  1996-2005.  The 
motivation for analysing the gender pay gap for this group is twofold. Firstly, we want to shed light 
on  the  potential  effects  of  having  children  and  other  household  responsibilities  on  the  gender 
compensation gap in top corporate jobs. There exists a large empirical literature on the gender wage   3 
gap  in  the  labour  market  in  general,  but  very  little  empirical  evidence  for  the  group  of  top 
executives in private companies. Secondly, since a number of studies suggest that gender diverse 
boards may improve firm performance, it should be expected that the gender gap in top executives‘ 
compensation  is  decreasing  over  time.  The  paper  sheds  light  on  the  ongoing  discussion  on 
discrimination and the potential existence of a glass ceiling or sticky floors in the upper part of the 
labour  market:  Is  the  gender  gap  in  compensation  explained  by  qualifications  and  observed 
household related background characteristics, i.e. are female top executives still lacking behind 
their male peers because of less education, less employment experience, household responsibilities 
etc.? Or do some firms permanently pay higher salaries to female managers, irrespective of female 
characteristics,  i.e.  is  unobserved  heterogeneity  in  top  managers‘  salaries  mainly  due  to  firm 
specific or individual specific factors?  
 
The  data  set  used  in  this  study  is  a  panel  employer-employees  data  set  on  top  managers  and 
potential  top  managers  in  Danish  private  companies.  We  have  very  precise  information  on 
occupational status in the firm, i.e. whether the individual is the CEO, is Vice-director or has an 
occupational status within the firm just below these levels. For the last sample year 2005, the data 
include  1867  CEOs,  8261  Vice-Directors  and  13,100  potential  top  executives.  The  data  set  is 
merged to administrative data on employees, and we have access to extensive information on firms 
as well as the households and spouses of the individuals that are included in our study.  
 
There exists a limited number of empirical analyses on the gender pay gap among top executives. 
These studies tend to explain most of the observed gender pay gap by the fact that women do not 
reach the top and become a CEO or only get close to the top and become Vice-Director. Earlier 
studies are typically based on firm level data, often restricted to listed firms. The present study adds 
to the existing literature by being able to estimate compensation functions for the narrowly defined 
groups of CEOs and Vice-Directors, and potential CEOs and Vice-Directors, respectively, based on 
three large panel data sets which also include detailed information on household background.  
 
In  this  study  we  find  that  the  overall  ‗raw‘  gender  compensation  gap  for  top  executives  and 
potential top executives decreased from 35 percent to 31 percent during the period 1996-2005. 
However,  when  looking  at  the  three  separate  groups,  CEOs,  Vice-Directors,  and  the  pool  of 
potential top executives and controlling for observed individual characteristics and unobserved time 
constant heterogeneity, the observed overall reduction of the gender compensation gap disappears.    4 
For CEOs, the reduction of the compensation gap was small and insignificant while for VD and 
potential top executives, the estimated gap even increased during the period 1996-2005. Further, for 
the  small  and  selected  group  of  CEOs,  we  find  that  controlling  for  unobserved  individual 
characteristics  the  estimated  gender  compensation  gap  even  increases  the  estimated  gender 
compensation gap. We interpret this result as an indication that the very few females who reach top 
positions in private firms are a highly selected sample who on average deviates from their male 
colleagues with respect to unobserved factors as motivation, ambitions, abilities etc.  
 
2. CEO compensation and gender 
The gender pay gap is typically analysed within a human capital framework where variations in 
observed  hourly  wages  are  explained  by  variations  in  observed  or  unobserved  human  capital 
variables, like experience, education, effort, and ability etc. When it comes to top management 
compensation, the mechanism explaining a potential gender wage gap may be different from the 
traditional human capital approach. In the corporate governance literature, the compensation of 
CEOs is explained by factors like firm size, firm performance, and ownership of the firm, see for 
instance Murphy (1999). Theories on promotion into CEO positions as for instance the ‗tournament 
theory‘,  see  Lazear  and  Rosen  (1981),  say  that  the  top  management  compensation  should  be 
examined  in  the  context  of  the  organization's  hierarchy  and  assessed  by  how  effectively  it 
stimulates performance throughout the company.  
    
However,  in  order  to  explain  why  female  top  managers  are  often  observed  to  have  lower 
compensation relative to comparable male managers, additional theories have to be applied. The 
classical Becker theory on discriminatory tastes may offer one explanation of a potential gender 
wage gap among top managers. If the board of directors has discriminatory preferences, they may 
pay lower salaries to female CEOs, ceteris paribus, i.e. even though tournament arguments may also 
play an important role when determining the pay structure within the firm. However, the traditional 
argument against the Becker discrimination theory may also apply in this case: Discriminatory 
firms  will  in  the  long  run  be  outperformed  and/or  female  executive  officers  will  leave 
discriminatory firms. 
 
Lazear and Rosen (1990) offer a theory which does not rely on an assumption of discriminatory 
behaviour among employers or in the boardroom. They show that women may end up in lower 
paying positions even though they have the same ability distribution as their male colleagues. This   5 
result is based on the assumption that women have outside alternatives (in the household) where 
they are more productive than their male colleagues.  
 
Coate  and  Loury  (1993)  present  an  alternative  theory  based  on  information  asymmetries  and 
statistical discrimination. Imprecise knowledge about the productivity of young women or their 
career preferences may lead to systematic underestimation of the productivity of this group. The 
uncertainty about female qualifications may be seen as an extra cost and may explain why these 
groups  have  lower  earnings  or  are  more  seldomly  promoted  into  top  managerial  positions. 
According to Coate and Loury (1993), statistical discrimination against women gives risk averse 
employers an incentive to offer women jobs with a lower level of on-the-job-training. Further, if 
women are aware of the existence of statistical discrimination in advance, this may discourage even 
well  qualified  potential  CEOs  from  investing  in  skills  and/or  discourage  them  to  apply  for 
promotion or wage increases.  
The theories by Lazear and Rosen and Coate and Loury may be considered explanations of why a 
‗glass ceiling‘ seems to exist for well qualified females who do not end up in top management 
positions even if they appear to be as well qualified as their male colleagues. However, according to 
Lazear and Rosen it should be expected that the relatively few women who are promoted into top 
positions, despite their gender, receive higher compensation growth due to promotion. Thus, the 
Lazear and Rosen, theory does not really explain why a gender gap in compensation should exist 
within narrowly defined groups of CEOs or Vice-Directors. According to the Lazear and Rosen 
theory we should expect that the relatively few women who reach the top are a highly selected 
group of women who are to a large extent single women, or they are married to spouses whose 
comparative advantages in household production more than outweigh their ‗biological deficiencies‘ 
with respect to child birth etc.  
 
A more recent theory moves the focus from the ‗ceiling‘ to the ‗floor‘. The ‗sticky floor theory‘, see 
Booth et al. (2003), assumes that females who are exposed to a discriminatory behaviour of the 
board of directors or the top management in the firm may not be able to move to another less 
discriminating firm if they have responsibilities in their private life. Married or cohabiting women 
with spouses who are also in top positions and women with young children may be less mobile 
compared  to  their  male  colleagues.  If  the  firm  is  aware  of  these  mechanisms  (whether  the 
explanation is lack of mobility or lack of outside job offers because of statistical discrimination) 
even non-discriminatory firms which have ‗discovered‘ the true ability of a woman may not pay as   6 
high salaries as they would have done in case of a male with comparable characteristics or position 
within the firm. Alternatively, women are not promoted to the same extent as men. Thus, the firm 
can earn a rent since women executives have fewer outside opportunities due to the invisibility of 
their abilities or due to lack of mobility because of family responsibilities.
1 This firm behaviour may 
explain why a permanent gender gap in compensation can exist. As in the case of the Lazear and 
Rosen theory, the spouse my also play an important role. Women who are married to a  spouse 
having a high occupational position may be much less mobile and  are not able to or wi lling to 
pursue their own career plans compared to single women or women who are married to spouses in 
lower paying job positions.      
 
The glass ceiling theory and the sticky floor theory point to different mechanisms when explaining 
the observed gender  pay  gap among top managers ,  and  it is not easy empirically to make a 
distinction between the two groups of theories.  Yurtoglu and Zulehner (2009b) use the position in 
the overall compensation distribution as an indicator on whether it is a ‗sticky floor‘ or a ‗glass 
ceiling‘ effect: If the gender gap is in the lower part of the distribution, they consider the gap as 
explained by sticky floor mechanisms, and if the gap appears in the upper part of the distribution, 
they use the notion of ‗glass ceiling‘. Further, according to the sticky floor theory, we might expect 
that household responsibilities (i.e. having young children or more children, or having a husband 
who is also having a career) have a more negative impact on female top executives‘ compensation, 
compared to males‘ compensation. Glass ceiling effects may potentially harm all women, whether 
actually having children or not.  
 
3. Previous empirical studies 
One of the first studies which examined the gender wage gap in top management was the study by 
Bertrand and Hallock (2001)  analysing the earnings of top five executives in a large sample of US 
firms  listed  by  Standard  &  Poor,  covering  the  period  1992-97.  Bertrand  and  Hallock  found  a 
considerable gender pay gap (around 44 percent). However,  when controlling for a number of 
observed characteristics, most of the gender wage differential was ‗explained‘ by observed factors 
as human capital variables, occupational level, industry, etc.   
 
                                                 
1 A number of papers have recently focussed on different risk behaviour among male and female potential top managers 
as one of the reasons for observing fewer women in CEO positions and as an explanation of an observed gender pay gap 
at the upper end of the skill distribution, see Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Booth (2009). 
   7 
Bell (2005) used the same approach and an updated version of the same data set as Bertrand and 
Hallock  (2005),  now  covering  the  years  1992-2003.  She  found  that  the  compensation  and 
promotion chances for female executives were significantly higher in women-led firms, i.e. there 
was a positive effect of female CEOs or female board chairmen on the salaries of female managers 
at lower levels in the firm. She explained this evidence by mentoring and supporting relations that 
more  productive  females  select  themselves  into  women-led  firms  because  they  expect  to  face 
(statistical) discrimination. Holst and Busch (2009) analyse the gender pay gap for managers in 
German firms based on SOEP data for the year 2006. They find that the overall percentage of 
women  employed  in  the  firm  has  a  negative  effect  on  the  salaries  of  both  male  and  female 
managers.    
 
Two  recent  papers  by  Yurtoglu  and  Zulehner  (2009a,b)  use  the  OSIRIS  data  set  on  total 
compensation for top executive officers in listed US firms for the period 2001-07. In Yurtoglu and 
Zulehner (2009a) it is found that the gender compensation gap was reduced to 19 percent for this 
sample and after controlling for individual and firm characteristics, the gap is reduced to 7 percent. 
In  Yurtoglu  and  Zulehner  (2009b),  a quantile  regression  approach  is  applied. They  find  larger 
estimated pay gaps at the bottom than at the top of the pay distribution. As in the former papers, the 
main explanation of the gender pay gap is differences in occupational positions, i.e. fewer women 
reach the top and highest paying positions in the firm.     
 
Bertrand  et  al.  (2009)  analyse  the  compensation  gender  gap  among  MBAs  graduating  from 
University of Chicago during the period 1990-2006. They find that male and female MBAs seem to 
follow the same career track until first child is expected or born. After birth of first child, the career 
of mothers and fathers with an MBA from University of Chicago diverges: Male MBAs experience 
constantly increasing earnings while MBA mothers on average have slightly decreasing earnings 
after birth of first child.
2 However, the analysis also indicates large differences between the female 
MBAs. Women married to spouses with lower earnings work more hours and have shorter periods 
out of the labour force compared to women who are married to high -earning‘ spouses. For women 
without children, the effect of being married to a high-earning spouse was positive. These results 
indicate that it is extremely important to control for factors related to household characteristics and 
                                                 
2 The same result is found in some studies on marital wage premium, see for instance Gupta et al. (2007).    8 
allocation of work between spouses when explaining the gender gap in compensation for CEOs and 
other top managers in private companies. 
 
3. Data  
The data set is a merged employer-employees unbalanced panel sample of the about 2000 largest 
Danish companies observed during the period 1996-2005. The companies are private firms, i.e. they 
are not part of the public sector. The firms may be privately owned or listed firms. The data set is 
selected from registers in Statistics Denmark. The information on firms is merged with individual 
information on the employees of the firm, including information on background characteristics of 
the spouses for employees who are either legally married or cohabiting. The register information 
from administrative registers is further merged with information from a private Danish data account 
data register, Experian (previously Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau).  
 
The sample is selected by Statistics Denmark‘s registers as the largest Danish firms, defined by total 
capital of the firms during each of the years 1996–2005. We delete all firms which do not have any 
employees, for instance holding companies etc.  From these firms, we select all the CEOs and Vice-
Director and potential CEOs (i.e. individuals who are in the occupational positions just below the 
CEO levels) observed as being employed at least one year in the selected firms during the period 
1996-2005. The definition of the three categories of managers in our study is based on the available 
information in Statistics Denmark‘s registers
3:  
 
  CEO: The CEOs in a firm with more than 50 employees. Given our definition, there is only 
one CEO in a firm. 
  Vice-director (VD): Top executive with an overall responsibility in a given area within the 
firm (restricted to firms with more than 50 employees). 
  Potential CEO or VD: ‗Pool of potentials‘ consists of employees with qualifications and 
occupational status below the CEO or VD level. 
 
                                                 
3 The exact definition using the Statistics Denmark‘s ‗DISCO-codes‘ is:  CEO=Executive director (RAS-DISCO code 
121, 1210). VD=Vice-Director (DISCO 122, 123, 1221-1239). Pool of potentials=Potential executives (CEO or VD). 
(First digit of DISCO code is 1 but not included in the groups of top or vice directors). The registration of the DISCO 
codes in the administrative registers has been improved during the observation period. In order to remove outliers or 
errors in the DISCO codes, we restrict the CEO group to individuals who are observed with an annual earnings in top 
10 of the firm and Vice-Director are further restricted to individuals who are observed among the top 25.     9 
By these definitions of top managers we end up having in total 198,686 observations during the 
period 1996-2005, of whom 20,264 were CEOs, 82,270 were Vice-Directors, and 96,152 were 
categorized as being member of the pool of potentials, see Table 1 in Section 4.  
 
The dependent variable in this study is annual compensation which is measured by the (log) annual 
earnings  (DKK),  Eijt.  Annual  earnings  are  defined  as  the  total  earnings  including  bonuses  etc. 
during the year as registered by the tax authorities. This measure excludes pension payments from 
the firm, non-taxable fringe benefits, stock options etc. on which we are not able to get reliable 
information. According to Bechmann (2008), 29 percent of Danish listed firms offered an option 
program in 2005 as part of the compensation for the top management. The proportion has been 
increasing since the late 1990s, see Eriksson (2001). Since these firms are among the largest Danish 
firms, we expect that the proportion is considerably lower in the sample selected for this study. The 
value of the option program changes over time and therefore, it is not obvious how to incorporate 
this information in a study of the gender pay gap. However, the results in Bechmann (2008) show a 
positive correlation between cash payments and the value of the option based compensation. This 
implies that by restricting the analysis to earnings defined as cash payments, the results in this study 
is expected to underestimate the gender gap. This expectation is supported by the study by Yurtoglu 
and Zulehner (2009a) who find that the gender pay gap is larger for the equity-based compensation 
component than for the fixed salary component.  Table 2 below presents the ‗raw‘, i.e. the simple 
average  ratio  between  female  and  male  earnings  in  each  of  the  years  for  the  three  groups  of 
employees.  
 
The included  explanatory  variables  in the estimations represent individual  (Xit) as well as firm 
specific (Xjt) characteristics, and variables reflecting spouse characteristics and whether the firm is 
more or less ‗women-led’: 
   
  Xit:  ‗Classical  human  capital‘  variables  as  employment  experience,  experience  squared, 
educational level. Employment experience is measured as the accumulated number of years 
spent in employment. Periods in part time employment  are counted as half of full time 
employment. We are not able to measure over time work or individuals holding more than 
one  job  as    the  employment  variables  are  based on pension payments  to  a  compulsory 
pension scheme (ATP). Education level is measured by three indicators for educational level 
allowing  for non-linear  effects of  education.  Excluded  category  is  no  education beyond   10 
compulsory school Child variables are indicators for number of children (1, 2, and 3+) and 
an indicator for a child aged less than 3 years in the household. Excluded category is ‗no 
children‘. 
  Xjt: Firm size is measured by number of employees, an indicator for being listed on stock 
exchange, firm profits ROE (Return On Equities), industry indicators (Energy, Building and 
construction, Hotel and restaurants, Transportations and telecommunications, Finance) and 
female proportion of employees. 
  Women-ledjt: Indicators for being employed in a firm with a female director on the board or 
a female CEO.  
  Spouseit: Occupational level of the spouse (high level salaried, low level salaried, skilled, 
unskilled, self-employed, others), and an indicator for the spouse being a CEO. Excluded 
category is ‗single‘, i.e. individuals who are not currently married or cohabiting. 
 
Sample means for 2005 of all variables included in the estimations are shown in Appendix Table 
A1. 
 
4. The gender gap in top management 
Table 1 shows the development in the female proportion of CEOs, Vice-Directors, and in the Pool 
of Potential top managers. There is a clear development with respect to the female representation in 
top management in Danish companies during this period. In 1996, the female shares in the three 
groups were 23 percent in the Pool of Potentials, 9 percent in Vice-Director and 3 percent in the 
group of CEOs. These figures which are consistent with earlier Danish studies, see Smith et al. 
(2006)  are  fairly  low  in  an  international  perspective..  However,  in  all  three  categories,  the 
proportion of women has increased substantially, especially in the CEO and VD groups, where the 
female proportion increased by about 60 percent during the period. 
 
The overall gender compensation gap decreased from 35 percent to 31 percent during the period 
1996-2005,  see  Table  2.  Within  each  of  the  two  sub-groups,  CEOs  and  VDs,  the  gender 
compensation  gap  was  decreasing.  Especially  for  CEOs,  there  was  a  dramatic  equalization  of 
compensation. In 1996, the gender gap was observed to 36 percent and in 2005 it was reduced to 13 
percent! However, the very few female top CEOs included in the sample (less than 100 in each of 
the years) implies a large variation in the observed ‗raw‘ gap. For Vice-Director, the gap is reduced   11 
during the observation period from 20 percent to 17 percent, while for the Pool of Potentials the gap 
has varied between 18-22 percent with no signs of a decreasing trend.  
 
Table 1. Female proportion among CEOs, VDs and Pool of Potentials. 
  ‗Pool of 
Potentials‘ 
Vice-Director  CEOs 







































No of obs.1996-2005 (all: 198,686) 











No of obs. 2005 (all: 23,228) 









Compared to the results for other countries, the gender compensation gap for Danish CEOs is fairly 
low. For the US, Bertrand and Hallock found a raw gender compensation gap of 44 percent for US 
top 5 CEOs (Standard & Poor‘s ExecuComp data). Bell (2005), using data on top 5 CEOs from 
Standard & Poor‘s 500, Midcap 400 and Smallcap 600 found a raw gender earnings gap of 25.4 
percent for the period 1992-2003. The structure of the Danish gender pay gap among top managers 
also looks very different from what is found for the US in Yurtoglu and Zulehner (2009b) where the 
largest gender pay gap is found at the lower end of the compensation distribution while the gender 
pay gap is found to be lowest at the upper end of the compensation distribution.  
 
   12 
Table 2. The gender gap in compensation (annual earnings).
1) 
   All  ‗Pool of 
Potentials‘ 
Vice-director  CEO 
1996  0.350  0.226  0.197  0.360 
1997  0.337  0.202  0.182  0.390 
1998  0.334  0.218  0.167  0.351 
1999  0.338  0.208  0.173  0.274 
2000  0.326  0.216  0.150  0.234 
2001  0.333  0.219  0.161  0.235 
2002  0.334  0.221  0.188  0.197 
2003  0.320  0.208  0.152  0.190 
2004  0.321  0.199  0.159  0.196 
2005  0.309  0.212  0.169  0.125 
1) The gender gap is calculated as 1-Eft /Emt, where  Eft  and  Emt  are average female and male annual 
earnings in year t respectively.  
 
In Table 3, the main characteristics of the male and female managers in our sample are shown for 
the year 2005. There are significant differences between men and women for most of the variables. 
However, for the group of CEOs the picture is slightly different. Female CEOs have about the same 
labour market experience as their male colleagues, and somewhat surprisingly, they do also have 
about the same number of children (the differences are not  statistically significant).
4 For Vice-
Directors and the Pool of Potentials, the average female working experience is significantly lower 
than their male colleagues, and the average number of children is about the same as for female 
CEOs. However, women in the Pool of Potentials are on average younger f emale CEOs, and thus, 
their completed fertility may end up being higher than that for female CEOs. 
 
Female VDs, potential top managers (and to some extent CEOs but here the difference is not 
significant) tend to be singles to a much larger extent than male  top managers. 25 percent of the 
female Vice-Directors are singles while this figure is only 10 percent for male Vice -Directors. If 
women in these groups are married, they are more likely than male top managers to be married to a 
CEO, i.e. fewer women in top management positions tend to be married to a spouse with a lower 
position than herself.  Female top managers or potential top managers tend to be in firms with a 
relatively high proportion of female employees. Finally, the probability that there is a female board 
member is larger for female CEOs and VDs compared to their male colleagues!  
                                                 
4 It should be kept in mind that the small number of females may imply that only very large differences are statistically 
significant from zero.   13 
Table 3. Sample means. Selected variables 2005. 
  Pool of Potentials  Vice-director  CEO 
  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female 





















































































































*) indicates significant gender difference (1 percent) in sample means. 
 
5. Empirical model and estimation strategy 
The  basic  empirical  model  is  a  ‗standard  Mincerian  human  capital  function‘  where  the  main 
explanatory variables are education and labour market experience. An indicator for being a woman 
is  included  in  order  to  estimate  the  gender  compensation  gap.  Since  the  focus  is  managerial 
compensation, we also include a number of variables reflecting corporate governance effects, like 
firm size, performance and industry. We successively add a number of variables to the human 
capital  model  which  are  supposed  to  catch  effects  from  family  responsibilities  and  firm 
characteristics, Xit, Xjt, and Women-ledjt. As a first step, we estimate pooled OLS on the sample of 
all top managers and including both males and females in all years. We add an indicator, F, for 
being female, and indicators for being CEO or VD in the company; 
 
1 2 1 2 ln ijt i ijt ijt it jt t t ijt E F CEO VD X X D    (1) 
                                  
where Dt are time indicators. The error term εitj is – in the first step - assumed to be uncorrelated 
with included explanatory variables. As we use panel employer-employees data and observed the   14 
same  individuals  and  firms  many  times  in  the  data  set,  the  error  term  is  expected  to  be 
heteroscedastic. Therefore, we apply a robust estimator which corrects for heteroscedasticity.
5 By 
adding more and more explanatory variables, we see how much of the raw gender earnings gap that 
may be explained by individual‘s own characteristics and firm characteristics.  
 
However, the assumption behind the pooled OLS estimation in (1) may not be valid. Specifically, 
the indicators of main interest, F, CEO and VD may be correlated with the error term because of 
omitted variables. According to the theories described in Section 2, selection into the position as 
CEO or top manager may be a selective process which differs between men and women. A number 
of  unobserved  characteristics  like  effort  and  ambitions  may  be  important,  both  for  observed 
compensation and for the chance of becoming promoted into a VD or CEO position. If selection 
works  differently  for  men  and  women,  for  instance  due  to  discrimination or  other  unobserved 
mechanisms, this may bias the estimates of the coefficients of the female indicator F, and the 
indicators for occupational top positions, CEO and VD. Thus, our estimates may not reflect causal 
effects.  
 
The identification strategy in this study is to apply a robust panel estimator (Fixed Effect Vector 
Decomposition,  FEVD  estimator,  see  below)  which  captures  the  unobserved  time  constant 
variables. However, the ‗fixed effect critique‘, see for instance Lundberg (2005) may also apply 
here.  Some  of  the  unobservables  may  change  over  time  due  to  life  cycle  variation  in  career 
ambitions  etc.,  and  these  changes  which  may  affect  career  choices  and  compensation  are  not 
captured by the panel estimator.  We try to address this time variant unobserved heterogeneity by 
adding exogenous controls that are expected to be correlated with the time variant unobservables in 
the compensation function. As candidates for being such  control variables we select the career 
(occupational) position of the spouse in the previous year, and whether the individual was married 
or cohabiting, (Spouseit-1). The career position of the spouse is expected to capture or proxy the 
current  decisions  within  the  household  with  respect  to  allocation  of  time  and  household 
responsibilities.
6 If the individual  changes marital status  (in the previous year)  or the spouse is 
promoted, we expect that these changes will reflect the lifecycle effects on preferences which are 
not captured by the FE or FEVD estimators.  However, it might be argued that  the spouse and 
                                                 
5 The models are estimated by STATA procedures. 
6 According to Bertrand et al. (2009) information on spouse‘s labour market career is a very good indicator for the 
career choices (labour supply behaviour and maternal leave periods) earlier in life.  
   15 
marital state variables are not exogenous to the outcome variable, the annual compensation, see for 
instance the discussion in  Angrist  and Pischke (2009). We use the lagged occupational  spouse 
position in order to reduce problems of endogeneity. In order to evaluate the potential endogeneity 
problems which may still exist, we show a number of alternative estimations in order to indicate the 
robustness of our estimations. 
 
The full model including both spouse variables as controls for the selection into top management 
position and time constant individual or firm specific effects (αi and αj) is:  
 
1 2 1 2 1 ln ijt i ijt ijt it jt t t it i j ijt E F CEO VD X X D Spouse              (2) 
 
The model in (2) is estimated by alternative panel estimators. Since one of the key variables, F, is 
time invariant and disappears in the fixed effects (FE) estimation, we also apply a random effects 
estimator (RE). These estimates are typically also inconsistent because the assumption that εijt is 
uncorrelated  with  included  explanatory  variables  is  violated.  This  assumption  is  tested  by  a 
Hausman test. As the assumption of independence is violated in most cases, we also apply a robust, 
but not unbiased, three stage estimator proposed recently by  Plümper and Troeger (2007). The 
estimator, denoted Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition (FEVD), is useful in cases where the main 
interest is in the coefficients of time invariant or rarely time varying variables. This is the case for 
the indicator for being female (F) and also the indicators for being top managers in the firm (CEO 
and VD) show little variation over time. The first step of the P&T estimator is a FE estimation of 
(2). In the second step the individual specific average residuals from the FE are calculated and 
regressed on the time invariant or rarely time varying variables. In step 3 the full model is re-
estimated by pooled OLS and the residuals from step two are included as an additional regressor. In 
order to evaluate the robustness of the estimators, the results from alternative estimators are shown 
for the key coefficients in Table 5.  
  
6. OLS estimates of Gender gap in compensation 
 
As a first step, we present in Table 4 estimated coefficients of the parameter λ in relation (1), i.e. the 
‗gender compensation gap‘, when correcting successively for more factors which may explain the   16 
annual  earnings.  The  results  which  are  comparable  to  many  of  the  results  found  in  previous 
empirical studies are based on robust pooled OLS estimations.
7   
 
Table 4. Gender gap in compensation:  
Robust Pooled OLS estimates of the coefficient of the female indicator (λ ). 
1. 
  Control variables included in estimation 















































R-squared  0.077  0.339  0.359  0.436  0.440  0.481 
Number of obs.  198,686  198,686  198,686  198,686  198,686  198,686 
1.  All coefficients are significant at a 1 percent level.   
. 
Column (0) shows an estimated coefficient of -0.37 (i.e. a raw gender compensation gap of 37 log 
points)  when  only  time  indicators  are  added  to  the  model.  When  adding  successively  more 
explanatory variables, the estimated coefficient of λ is reduced, but the coefficient seems to stabilize 
at a level around -0.17, i.e. an estimated gender compensation gap of around 17 log points. The 
main drop in the numerical value of the λ-coefficient happens when adding indicators for being a 
CEO or a Vice-Director. The coefficient is reduced numerically from -0.37 to -0.22. This result 
corresponds to most previous empirical analyses, see for instance Bertrand and Hallock (2001). 
However,  our  results  are  different  from  these  studies  in  the  sense  that  the  estimated  gender 
compensation gap does not become insignificant in the full model with all explanatory variables. 
Further, adding variables for number and age of children and firm characteristics virtually have no 
influence on the estimated gender compensation gap.  
 
7. Robustness - Alternative Panel Estimators  
The robust pooled OLS estimates in Table 4 may suffer from a number of deficiencies as discussed 
above. Therefore, in Table 5 alternative estimators of the gender pay gap are presented in order to 
evaluate the sensitivity and robustness of the estimators. Table 5 also adds the estimates of the 
indicators for having a position as CEO or as Vice-Director in the company. 
 
                                                 
7 The estimates are corrected for heteroscedasticity due to firm clusters by using  the STATA procedure xtreg. In 
alternative estimations not shown here, heteroscedasticity corrections due to individual clusters are undertaken. The 
estimated standard errors are smaller in these estimations. The more conservative estimations are presented in Table 4.       17 
Table 5. Alternative estimates of indicators for being  
Female, CEO and Vice-Director
1. Full model specification. 
    Estimator 































































Other RHS variables: 
   Spouse occupation 
   HC variables 
   Child variables 















R-square overall  0.481  0.453  0.418  -  0.396  0.422  (0.918) 
Number of 
observations 
198,686  198,686  198,686  198,686  198,686  198,686  198,686 
1. All coefficients are significant at a 1 percent level 
 
The pooled robust OLS results in Column (1) in Table 5 are identical to the estimation of the full 
model in Column (5) in Table 4. Columns (2)-(4) show random effects estimated where individual, 
firm, and both individual and firm effects are accounted for, respectively, while Columns (5)-(6) 
show fixed effects estimates.
8 Finally, the robust  (but inconsistent) estimates by the fixed e ffect 




According to Table 5, the estimated gender gap in compensation for Danish top managers does not 
disappear  when  controlling  for  the  full  battery  of  explanatory  variables  and  accounting  for 
individual or firm specific unobserved time constant heterogeneity. The estimates of the indicator 
for being female range from -0.14 to -0.22. All coefficients are highly significant. Thus, our results 
indicate  there  is  still  a  considerable  gender  compensation  gap  among  top  manager s  when 
controlling for observed and unobserved individual and firm characteristics.   
 
The estimated coefficients are  clearly sensitive to the specification. The RE , FE, and the FEVD 
which control for individual specific effects  (Columns 2,4,7).and the RE which controls for both 
                                                 
8 The Hausman tests reject the overall hypothesis that the random effects estimates are consistent. 
9 The FEVD is only estimated for individual specific fixed effects not firm specific effects because the command xtfevd 
in STATA does not allow more observations on the same unit within a given year.   18 
firm and individual effects (Column 5) are fairly close. The estimated λ-coefficients in the RE and 
FEVD estimations are -0.20 and -0.22, respectively. These coefficients are numerically larger than 
the pooled OLS estimate of -0.17, i.e. controlling for unobserved individual specific factors like 
ability and ambitions, the gender compensation gap increases, or alternatively, some of the female 
(male) top managers have permanently high (low) values of the individual specific factors which 
affect their compensation positively (negatively). When controlling for these factors, the estimated 
gender gap increases, compared to pooled OLS estimates.  
 
The RE and FE estimates which control only for permanent firm specific unobserved factors in 
Columns (3) and (6) are somewhat different. The estimated λ-coefficient is numerically lower, only 
-0.14, compared to RE/FEVD estimates of-0.20 and  -0.22. This observation may reflect that some 
firms permanently tend to pay females (males) lower (higher) salaries when controlling for all 
observables,  for  instance  due  to  variation  in  time  constant  preferences  for  discrimination  or 
permanently gender biased information on skills and productivity, as proposed in the ‗sticky floor‘ 
theory.  However, the results in Columns 3, 4 and 6 also show that  even when controlling for 
unobserved differences in firm behaviour (and in Column 6 also individual unobserved effects) 
there still exists a considerable compensation gap between male and female top executives. Thus, 
despite the results in Table 5 indicate that part of the gender gap can be explained by some firms 
permanently paying lower female executives lower salaries, a major part of the compensation gap 
remains unexplained.       
 
In contrary to the  λ-coefficients, the estimated coefficient of the two CEO and VD indicators are 
considerably (and tests show that the difference is significant) higher in RE and FE estimations 
where we control for unobserved firm heterogeneity, compared to pooled OLS and RE/FE/FEVD 
estimates  with  control  for  unobserved  individual  heterogeneity.  Thus,  some  firms  tend  to  pay 
permanently higher salaries to their top managers
10.  
 
Based on the results presented in Table 5, it is obvious that there are alternative estimates of the 
‗gender compensation gap‘ and that the size of the gap depends on choice of estimator. But in all 
cases, the estimated gap is significant and of a considerable size (lowest estimate is 14 log points). 
                                                 
10 The results from individual FE/RE/FEVD estimations of the VD and CEO are in line with the results found in 
Eriksson (1999) based on a different sample of Danish companies. Eriksson find a pay difference between CEO and VD 
level of around 30 percentage points in individual fixed effect estimations of annual compensation. Eriksson does not 
include gender indicators in his study.    19 
In line with most other studies, and for comparison reason, we prefer to use an estimator which only 
controls for individual specific effects. Further, the individual specific effect estimators allow us to 
reduce problems of endogeneity in the individual specific variables like human capital variables, 
child  variables  and  the  spouse  control  variables.  Since  the  RE  estimators  are  rejected  by  the 
Hausman test, and since the FE estimator with individual specific effects does not allow for an 
estimate  of  the  λ-coefficient,  the  preferred  estimator  in  the  subsequent  sections  is  the  FEVD 
estimator which controls for individual specific unobserved heterogeneity and is robust though not 
consistent. However, note that the FEVD estimates for the CEO and VD-indicators are very close to 
the consistent FE estimates. In order to evaluate sensitivity of the estimates, we also present robust 
pooled OLS and RE estimates of λ where relevant.               
 
8. Within Group Panel Estimates of the Gender Compensation Gap. 
The ‗raw‘ figures on gender proportion and compensation gap in Tables 1-2 clearly showed that 
there has been a quite different development within the three groups of top managers and potential 
top  managers.  In  this  section,  we  dig  deeper  into  this  question  and  estimate  the  gender 
compensation gap within the three groups, i.e. the sample is split into the three groups, CEOs, VDs, 
and Pool of Potentials, and separate compensation functions are estimated for each of the three 
groups.  
 
When splitting the sample into these groups, it is obvious that each of the groups may be selected 
samples  of  the  population  which  may  vary  systematically  with  respect  to  unobservable 
characteristics,  for  instance  ability  and  motivation.  If  ability  is  correlated  with  the  included 
variables,  for  instance  gender,  the  estimate  of  λ  will  be  biased,  unless  controlling  for  the 
unobservables,  parallel  to  the  problems  of  potential  endogeneity  when  including  indicators  for 
being a CEO or VD in the estimations above. However, to the extent that the unobservables are 
time  constant,  a  robust  panel  estimator  like  FEVD  is  expected  to  account  for  the  selectivity 
problem. The results from pooled robust OLS, RE and FEVD estimates of the λ-coefficient within 
the three groups of managers are shown in Table 6. According to Table 6, our results are again 
fairly robust to choice of estimator with respect  to the estimated  λ-coefficient  within the three 
groups of managers. 
   20 
Table 6 reveals that  there  are large  variations within the three groups.
11  The estimated gender 
compensation gap after controlling for all observables is largest among CEOs, amounting to about 
30 log points (λ-coefficients in the range -0.29 to -0.33). It is lower for VDs, with a λ-coefficient in 
the range -0.17 to -0.21 and lowest in the ‗Pool of Potentials‘, where the λ-coefficient is about 
minus 0.15. These results are opposite to the results found for the US in Yurtoglu and Zulehner 
(2009b) where the largest gender pay gap was found at the bottom of the pay distribution and the 
smallest gap at the top of the distribution. Thus, our results indicate that there are both a glass 
ceiling and sticky floors, but the first effect is more pronounced than the latter.   
 
Table 6. Panel estimates of the coefficient of the female indicator F. 
Within groups of CEOs, VDs and Pool of Potentials. 


























Other RHS variables: 
   Time indicators 
   Spouse occupation 
   HC variables 
   Child variables 







*) Coefficient is significant at a 1 percent level 
 
 
Compared  to  the  ‗raw‘  gender  compensation  gap  in  Table  2,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the 
estimated gap in Table 6 is lower for the group of potential top managers (around 15 percent) 
compared to the ‗raw‘ gap in Table 2 of about 20-22 percent. The opposite is observed for the group 
of  top  managers  who  are  CEOs.  According  to  Table  2,  the  raw  compensation  gap  for  CEOs 
decreased from 36 percent to 13 percent but the estimated compensation gap after controlling for 
observed and unobserved characteristics is around 30 percent (or more precisely ‗log points‘). This 
finding confirms the findings also found in Table 5 that the group of (female) CEOs is a highly 
selected group of females, who have been able to break the ceiling and become CEOs, and these 
women seem to have unobserved time invariant characteristics which affect their compensation 
positively. Since Table 2 indicated a large change in the raw gender compensation gap for this 
                                                 
11 This is confirmed by formal F-tests on differences in coefficients between the three groups.    21 
group of CEOs, it is interesting to estimate the change in the gap during the observation period 
1996-2005 in order to evaluate whether the raw figures in Table 2.  
 
9. Is the gender compensation gap changing over time? 
Figure 1 shows the estimated change in the gender compensation gap between 1996 and 2005. The 
estimation is based on the same model as in Table 6, Column 3, i.e. separate FEVD estimations on 
the three groups of top managers, except that an interaction term is added to the model, F*Dt in 
order to allow for a separate compensation development over time for male and female executives. 
Thus, the interaction terms estimates the (cumulative) change in the gender compensation gap.       
 
Figure 1. Estimated Gender Gap in Compensation
1. 
 
1.Panel estimates (FEVD) of the coefficients of F + F*Dt.  




According to Figure 1 the estimated gender compensation gap in 1996 was around -0.15, -0.20 and 
-0.32 for the Pool of potentials, VDs, and CEOs, respectively. During the period 10-year-period 



























CEO   22 
potentials,  1.8  log  points  among  VDs.  However,  for  CEOs  the  trend  was  different.  Here,  the 
estimated gap decreased by 3.3 log points. The latter figure is not statistically significant which may 
be because of the large estimated variance on the estimated coefficients because of the very few 
female CEO observations.  
 
It is interesting to note that the development in Figure 1 is remarkable different from the ‗raw‘ 
gender gap figures in Table 2 which showed a substantial reduction for CEOs (from 36 percent to 
13 percent) and smaller reductions for VD and potential executives. For the two latter groups, our 
estimates indicate a significant increase in the estimated compensation gap, not a reduction. For 
CEOs, the estimated gender gap reduction is much smaller than the raw figures indicate. Thus, the 
results show some signs of small ‗cracks in the glass ceiling‘ in Denmark during the period 1996-
2005 – though the ceiling still seems to exist and be fairly thick!  However, lower down in the 
occupational hierarchy, the ‗floors have become even more sticky‘, i.e. the compensation gap has 
widened. 
 
10. Gender specific estimations 
Until  now,  the  estimated  models  have  assumed  the  same  coefficients  to  male  and  female 
characteristics, except the constant term, which is clearly rejected by the data when performing 
simple  F-tests  of  equality  of  coefficients.  Therefore,  gender  specific  panel  data  models  are 
estimated in order to allow for gender specific remuneration to observed characteristics. Selected 
results from Fixed Effects estimations are shown in Tables 7. The fixed effect estimator is applied 
here because we are interested in the effects from time varying variables. Full estimations are given 
in Appendix Table A2.  
 
In general, the results clearly indicate that the compensation functions for female CEOs and to a 
smaller extent VDs are quite different compared to the group of female potential top executives. It 
is well known from many studies of the gender wage gap, for Denmark see for instance Gupta, 
Smith and Stratton (2007), that men tend to have steeper career profiles (i.e. higher remuneration to 
experience in the early career but then more flat later in the career compared to women), children 
and marriage have little effect on male wages and may sometimes even increase their earnings 
through  a  ‗marriage  premium‘  while  women  often  incur  a  ‗child  penalty‘.  However,  when 
estimating separate functions for the more narrow groups of top executives, the picture seems to be 
somewhat different from the ‗traditional‘ human capital gender wage gap studies. For female CEOs   23 
we do not find any significant effects of children, while male CEOs are estimated to get a negative 
compensation shock of 2.8 percent the first years after they become fathers. The results for the 
female CEOS also deviate from the parallel results for females in the Pool of Potentials and to a 
smaller degree Vice-Director for whom the child variables have much more negative effects on 
compensation, more in line with traditional human capital wage functions. Female CEOs do on 
average have one child, as their male colleagues, see Table 3, and apparently – conditionally on 
having succeeded to reach a CEO position - they do not incur a ‗child penalty‘.
12 We explain this 
finding as a further indication that women who reach the top of the firm and pass the ‗glass ceiling‘ 
are  highly  selected  and  very  different  with  respect  to  a  number  of  unobserved  characteristics 
compared to other women. E.g. for women in the Pool of Potentials and to some extent Vice-
Director children still have a clear negative effect on their compensation but no or even a positive 
effect for men in these groups. Hence our results may reflect that before reaching the CEO level, 
women has ―paid‖ their child penalty in terms of compensation, and eventually, a lower likelihood 
of promotion (not studied into detail in this study). 
 
Table 7.  Selected Coefficients from FE Estimations of  
Gender Specific Earnings Functions. 1996-2005. 
  Pool of potentials  Vice-Director  CEOs 
  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female 
             































































             
































-  - 







-  -  -  - 
* Significant at 1 percent, ¤ significant at 5 percent, ¤¤ significant at 10 percent 
 
                                                 
12 Holst and Busch (2009) find the same results in a study on German top executives.    24 
A crucial question is of course whether our estimates of child effects can be interpreted as causal 
effects. If the estimations in Table 7 still suffer from endogenity problems, whether due to omitted 
variables or reverse causality, we expect the child coefficients to be biased downwards. Since the 
estimates for female CEOs are positive (insignificant), the positive/insignificant estimates are lower 
bounds on the effects of children. However, the large and negative child effects for females in the 
pool  of  potential  executives  (and  to  a  smaller  extent  VDs)  may  overestimate  the  negative 
compensation effects of children. The same holds for the variables reflecting being single and the 
indicators for the career position of the spouse, i.e. occupational variables. With these reservations 
in mind, it is interesting to note the numerically large negative (highly significant) coefficient in the 
female CEO-regression for being married to a CEO spouse. The estimations indicate that female 
CEOs married to or cohabiting with a husband who is also a CEO earns 17 percent less than single 
females in CEO position, cet. par. 
 
Firms with a high share of females among the employees pay lower salaries to managers below 
Vice-director  and  CEO  level  (controlling  for  industry  and  other  firm  characteristics)  and  male 
CEOs, but female CEOs are apparently not punished for being employed in a female dominated 
firm. Exactly the same pattern is found for Germany in the study by Holst and Busch (2009) while 
Cardoso and Winter-Ebner (2007) find that a high female share only affects female top executives 
negatively in Portuguese firms.  
 
Finally, contrary to other recent empirical findings for the US and Portugal, see Bell (2005) and 
Cardoso  and  Winter-Ebner  (2007),  our  results  do  not  confirm  any  hypothesis  on  firms  being 
‗female friendly‘ by being ‗female-led‘, either because of a female CEO or having at least one 
woman on the board of directors. The coefficients are either insignificant or significantly negative, 
also for the female executives
13.   
 
11. Discussion and conclusion 
The  proportion  of  women  in  executive  positions  is  low  in  Denmark  compared  to  many  other 
countries. In 1996, only 3 percent of the CEOs in private firms were women. However, during the 
period 1996-2005, the female share among VDs and CEOs increased substantially, and also the 
                                                 
13 In alternative estimation not shown we have estimated the same model but including firm specific fixed effects 
instead of individual specific effect. These estimations show the same results with respect to the variables representing 
female led firms.    25 
group  of potential  top executives  became  more  gender  balanced during  this period. The  ‗raw‘ 
gender compensation gap among the executives included in this study was reduced from 35 percent 
to 31 percent between 1996 and 2005.  
 
The gender compensation gap among Danish executives is estimated by applying a number of 
alternative panel estimators. The results in this study indicate that there still exists a considerable 
gender gap in compensation after controlling for a large number of observable factors for both 
individuals and firms and estimating panel models which also control for unobserved time constant 
heterogeneity. Especially the small group of female CEOs receives a much lower compensation 
compared to their male CEO colleagues. For this group, the indicator for being female is estimated 
to be -0.30. For VDs and potential top executives the female coefficient is estimated to -0.21 and -
0.16, respectively. Thus, comparing to the results found in other countries, in Denmark there is still 
a considerable glass ceiling, defined as a large estimated compensation gap for CEOs, but also 
evidence of sticky floors, defined as a statistically significant and substantial compensation gap 
among potential CEOs, here defined as the Pool of Potential and Vice-Directors.  
 
During  the  period  1996  to  2005,  the  estimated  gender  compensation  gap  increased,  especially 
among potential top executives, but also for VDs. For CEOs, the estimated compensation gap is 
slightly reduced during the period. Thus the results are mixed with respect to the answer whether 
the ‗glass ceiling‘ is cracking and the ‗sticky floors‘ are becoming less sticky in Denmark. On one 
hand, the female proportions in the three groups of executives analysed in this study have clearly 
been increasing, indicating that women have become more able to reach top positions. On the other 
hand, with regards to remuneration, females are still not able to crack the glass ceiling. During the 
period, the estimated gender compensation gap even increased for the potential executives. This 
evidence may reflect that the floors have become more ‗sticky‘.  
 
The  results  in  this study  may  be  unexpected  and does not  point  to large  changes  in  women‘s 
position in the private sector in Denmark. The very low  (though increasing) number of female 
CEOs in Danish private firms, a large estimated compensation gap, and the very moderate reduction 
of the gap for CEOs and even increasing gap for top executives below the level of CEO may come 
as a surprise. One potential explanation might be that some firms might permanently pay females 
(males)  lower  (higher)  salaries,  for  instance  due  to  variation  in  time  constant  preferences  for 
discrimination or permanently gender biased information on skills and productivity, as proposed in   26 
the ‗sticky floor‘ theory. We do find evidence of this behaviour in Danish firms. Controlling for 
unobserved  firm  specific  effects,  the  estimated  gender  compensation  gap  is  reduced  by  some 
percentage points compared to both simple OLS estimates and panel estimates which controls only 
for unobserved individual specific effects. However, even when controlling for such unobserved 
differences in firm behaviour there still exists a considerable compensation gap between male and 
female top executives and potential top executives of around 14 percent.   
 
One explanation of the unexplained and stable compensation gap may be general effects of the 
universal and generous family friendly schemes, for instance maternity leave and care days for sick 
children, which in Denmark are mainly taken up by mothers (including female top executives), 
while fathers have not been using the schemes to far the same extent. As in many other European 
countries, the Danish maternity and parental leave schemes have been extended continuously since 
the mid 1980s and now amounts to 1 year per child with full or partly compensation and job 
protection, see Gupta, Smith and Verner (2008). These fairly generous schemes have ensured a 
constantly high fertility in the Nordic countries (the fertility rate in Denmark is 1.8), contrary to 
many other Western countries. In Denmark it is mainly mothers who take-up these leave periods 
while fathers‘ take-up rate has been stable around 5 percent. The same tendency is observed with 
respect to absence from work due to care for sick children and other care days.  
 
Due to statistical discrimination mechanisms, the extension of the family friendly schemes may 
have had negative boomerang effects on the compensation and careers of all women, irrespective of 
whether they eventually become mothers or not. Especially for those women aiming to reach the top 
of  the  organization,  these  effects  may  be  important  because  potential  career  interruptions  are 
expected to be more severe for this group. Thus, when controlling for age and actual number of 
children and individual and firm specific unobserved factors as it is done in the estimations in this 
study, we may not catch the full effect of children on women‘s career and compensation. If all 
Danish women – even potential top executives - are expected by the employer to have 2 children 
and if virtually all mothers pick-up full maternity and parental leave of one year per child, this may 
be a major drawback for potential promotion and compensation for the female executives. It is not 
possible to control for these overall mechanisms which may be part of the explanations behind the 
large and stable unexplained compensation gaps found in this analysis because, by definition, the 
statistical discrimination effects will potentially affect all women. These effects will be included in 
the unexplained part of the gap, i.e. give indication of both ‗sticky floors‘ and ‗glass ceilings‘.    27 
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Appendix: Table A1. Sample means. 2005. 
  ‗Pool of potentials‘  Vice-Director  CEOs 
  Male  Female  p-value  Male  Female  p-value  Male  Female  p-value 














































































                 
 

































































Spouse characteristics                   



























































































                   
Firm characteristics                   
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Others  0.00  0.00  0.615  -  -    -  -   
 
 
(0.03)    (0.03)           
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Table A2. FE Estimations of Gender Specific Earnings Functions. 1996-2005. 
  Pool of potentials  Vice-Director  CEOs 
  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female 
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Child-variables:             




































3+ children (0/1) 
 



































































































Firm variables             
















































Industry (Excl. manufacturing)             
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-  - 







-  -  -  - 
Constant, Year dummies 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R square (overall)  0.202  0.290  0.140  0.218  0.024  0.022 
R square  (within)  0.236  0.249  0.355  0.378  0.200  0.266 
R square  (between) 
 
0.186  0.282  0.125  0.232  0.076  0.008 
Number of observations
  74,353  21,799  73,942  8,328  19,495  769 
* Significant at 1 percent, ¤ significant at 5 percent, ¤¤ significant at 10 percent 
 
 
   